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Together, the G20 states collectively account for more than eighty percent of global 
CO2 emissions.1 Of the Group of Twenty, only China and the European Union have chosen 
to develop a carbon trading system at the national (or, in the EU’s case, supranational) level. 
This paper will examine the development of the carbon market system in the European Union 
since the founding of its Emission Trading System, and compare its strategies, methods, and 
successes with those of the nascent emissions trading system under development in China. 
In addition, it will examine the institutional design of these two carbon markets – and 
emissions trading systems in general – as political and economic structures, with a particular 
focus on allocation. Finally, it will compare the political goals and measurable results of the 
two emissions trading systems, and explore connections therein to the systems’ institutional 
design differences. 
Chiefly, this paper will seek to answer a guiding question: how does the institutional 
design of Europe’s Emission Trading Scheme differ from the developing “Low Carbon 
Development Pilot Program” emissions trading system in China? By exploring the 
mechanisms of structural implementation, the political goals, and the measurable effects, I 
will draw conclusions regarding optimal strategies for carbon trading systems’ 
implementation. Because this paper will focus on institutional design, economics will not be 
a primary focus; nevertheless, I will rely on data from the European Commission, the Chinese 
government, and a number of third party sources from relevant academia, international 
institutions, and public data records to support and challenge arguments related to the topic 
of emissions trading.  
While this analysis will balance comparison between the two systems, the much 
shorter history of the Chinese system means that much is still unknown regarding its 
implementation. Much of the section on China, therefore, will concern the institutional 
designs of the eight Chinese “pilot” systems with which the country has made its first 
tentative steps towards emissions trading. I will attempt to survey the outlook for the Chinese 
scheme fairly, and to properly acknowledge space for further developments in the 
implementation of that country’s carbon market. As with the section of the paper that focuses 
on the European emissions market, however, in instances where the market mechanisms 
appear to fall short or lack notable elements core to the European ETS, I will note that as 
1 Global Carbon Atlas. CO2 Emissions. 2017. Annual CO2 Emissions. 
| McLaughlin 3 
well. This paper is, after all, first and foremost intended to be a researched comparison 
between disparate institutions. 
This paper will be divided into several sections. First, I will briefly cover the history 
of emissions trading as a tool of public policy, relying heavily on the work of Prof. Jan-Peter 
Voß at Technische Universität Berlin to identify significant trends in the early development 
and academic progress of carbon trading as a hypothetical, then practical policy tool, and to 
establish a foundation upon which I will then explore some of the lessons to be learned from 
the successes and failures of these policies over time. While much of this early conceptual 
development took place in the United States, significant policy leaps were also achieved in 
Europe, and both are important to include here for contextual reasons of policy decision-
making described later on in the thesis. Notable among these is the ability of EU ETS 
participants to take advantage of international emissions reduction mechanisms like those of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change under the terms of the 
domestic ETS structure, a feature that not only has proven valuable to the European Union’s 
emissions market, but also to China’s nascent market as well. 
Next, I will write about the institutional design choices possible when developing an 
emissions market, and the different objectives and priorities tied to each. This paper is not an 
analysis of emissions trading in general. But it would be entirely impossible to do justice to 
the topic of comparing institutional design of multiple specific emissions market systems 
without at least a substantial acknowledgement and overview of the most important choices 
involved with the development of emissions trading systems as common policy. This section 
of the thesis will draw heavily from publications by the World Bank and the OECD, 
alongside a number of academic experts in the field from both the political and economic 
aspects of the subject. Particular focus on questions of allocation and enforcement will form 
core parts of this section. 
After covering the history and design choices of carbon market systems, the next 
sections of this thesis will be devoted to examining the European Union and Chinese 
emissions trading systems as unique entities. Each emissions market was developed with a 
unique set of intentions, means of implementation, and long-term strategies. In order to 
ensure that this thesis covers the relevant academic ground on this developing topic, I will 
focus this part of the paper on the institutional design choices made in the political 
development of these programs, rather than their economic or legal underpinnings. 
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Nevertheless, a few vital economic considerations are key to a comprehensive overview of 
certain policy choices and their consequences, and will be explored in appropriate detail. 
The following sections of the thesis will attempt to relate the choices made in the 
contemporary political development of the European Union and Chinese emissions markets 
to the historical outcomes of similar policy choices, and then to evaluate the areas of potential 
risk and areas of likely success for the two market schemes. In the interest of remaining 
impartial, these evaluations will not be judgments of value; rather, I will do my best to 
demonstrate particular qualities, institutional design choices, or trends that seem likely to 
make a distinct positive or negative impact of the outcome of each emissions trading system 
going forward, based on how those qualities, choices, or trends affected previous emissions 
trading policy endeavors. 
In sum, I will comprehensively and plainly identify the main issues around which the 
two emissions markets in focus have evolved, are evolving, and will evolve, and the 
implications of such development for institutional design of emissions trading systems in 
general. What hurdles, for example, does an authoritarian government like the People’s 
Republic of China face when implementing an emissions trading scheme that a union of 
democratic government – the European Union – does not? Conversely, are there specific 
areas in which the Chinese ability to develop and implement policy quickly lends the 
Communist Party more flexibility in its emissions market implementation than its European 
Union counterpart? For these questions and more, I will rely heavily on the work of 
researchers from both Europe and China, as well as third-party evaluations from the United 
States and Australia. By collating the two systems’ decision-making processes and priorities, 
I will establish a general set of noteworthy areas of comparison and contrast. 
I. Development of Emissions Trading as a Policy Instrument
One of the chief challenges to reducing greenhouse gas emissions is the lack of a 
direct cost to the emitter. While there are myriad indirect costs to the global climate (and by 
extension, humanity at large) from emissions, in a traditional market system the polluter must 
only account for the costs of doing business, not the costs of its waste. Since greenhouse gas 
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emissions are generally simply released into the atmosphere, it is incredibly easy, in the 
absence of some enforced cost mechanism, for polluters to disregard emissions costs to 
society at large. After all, the ultimate indirect costs – air pollution, climate change, rising 
sea levels, et cetera – are not borne directly by the polluter. In a sense, this is the prototypical 
problem of an unaccounted-for externality; in a multilateral system with many inputs and 
outputs, the entities causing a problem may have no individual incentive to stop causing said 
problem, much less to work to solve it.2 In the absence of some regulatory authority, a 
hypothetical system involving a number of emitters sees improved outcomes for the general 
public (i.e. the global climate) only at their own initiative – which is to say, only once it 
becomes less costly to abate emissions than to continue emitting greenhouse gases at 
business-as-usual levels. As the scientific consensus on global climate change – and the 
general trend towards inaction of emitters not incentivized by emissions trading or carbon 
taxes – has made clear, that hypothetical point of less cost will not arrive in time to avert 
climate catastrophe.3 Governments, therefore, must take decisive action to limit emissions 
should their citizens wish to play a part in diminishing negative impact on global climate, by 
imposing costs on emitters.  
Emissions trading, alternatively called “cap and trade”, is a policy approach to 
achieve emissions reduction in a market economy, by eliminating the aforementioned 
externality problem in pollution. Instead of allowing pollutants (in this case, greenhouse 
gases) to simply be emitted freely into the atmosphere, emissions are made a scarce – and 
therefore valuable – commodity.4 A public entity with legal authority is given the ability to 
distribute, via sale or allocation, a specified number of certificates corresponding to a specific 
quantity of emitted pollution.5 Generally, emissions certificates are traded by the ton, though 
certificates are often used in bulk at much higher numbers. Polluters may not only purchase 
or receive these certificates; they may also sell them to other polluters, or in some cases sell 
them back to the issuing body of government. A market for emissions is thus established. As 
a consequence of emissions costs being attached back to the polluter via this market 
2 Stavins, Robert N. “Experience with Market-Based Environmental Policy Instruments.” SSRN Electronic 
Journal, vol. 01, no. 58, 1999, 10.2139/ssrn.199848. Accessed 26 July 2019. 
3 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. “Global Warming of 1.5 oC —.” Ipcc.Ch, Global Warming of 
1.5 oC, 2019, www.ipcc.ch/sr15/. 
4 Stavins, Robert N. “Experience with Market-Based Environmental Policy Instruments.” SSRN Electronic 
Journal, vol. 01, no. 58, 1999, 10.2139/ssrn.199848. Accessed 26 July 2019. 
5 ibid 
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mechanism, polluting entities in the market system are incentivized to reduce emissions 
independently, without direct government intervention.6 
Over time, in the ideal carbon trading model, the public entity responsible for issuing 
emissions certificates will draw down the number of certificates issued. This generally 
happens at a steady, predetermined rate designed to ensure market scarcity continues to be 
preserved, though mid-term adjustments can take place should the market mechanism fail to 
induce the necessary degree of incentive. As the supply of certificates falls with time, the 
cost of polluting grows, and polluters respond either by shifting industry away from polluting 
processes or investing in technology to reduce their emissions. After several years of this 
system, issued emissions certificates are eventually reduced to zero, by which time the 
emissions of sectors managed by the emissions trading system are eliminated entirely, at least 
within the covered sectors of the ETS.7 
The first policy responses to the developing problem of greenhouse gas emissions 
were in fact developed before the widespread scientific consensus about anthropogenic 
climate change was established. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States’ National 
Air Pollution Control Administration sought a policy-level strategy to ease the impact of 
then-devastating smog outbreaks in major American cities8. The NAPCA (which now exists 
as a subsidiary office of the modern U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) ran a series of 
test analyses across several cities9, using a statistical approach to select “the least-cost 
combination” of emissions regulations for emitters that could be designed responsively to 
reach a particular air quality level.10 The results of those tests, refined into more generally-
applicable models, began what Jan-Peter Voß of Technische Universität Berlin calls the 
“Gestation” period of emissions trading as a policy tool.11  
6 ibid 
7 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. “Emissions Trading: Trends and Prospects 
(Archived).” http://Iea.Org/Papers/2007/ET_Trends&Prospects.Pdf, 2010, 
web.archive.org/web/20111103100702/iea.org/papers/2007/ET_Trends&Prospects.pdf. Accessed 13 July 
2019. 
8 Kuklinska, Karolina, et al. “Air Quality Policy in the U.S. and the EU – a Review.” Atmospheric Pollution 
Research, vol. 6, no. 1, Jan. 2015, pp. 129–137, 10.5094/apr.2015.015. Accessed 18 July 2019. 
9 ibid 
10 Burton, Ellison S., and William Sanjour. “A Simulation Approach to Air Pollution Abatement Program 
Planning.” Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, vol. 4, no. 1, Mar. 1970, pp. 147–159, 10.1016/0038-
0121(70)90036-4. Accessed 15 July 2019. 
11 Voß, Jan-Peter. “Innovation Processes in Governance: The Development of ‘Emissions Trading’ as a New 
Policy Instrument.” Science and Public Policy, vol. 34, no. 5, 1 June 2007, pp. 329–343, 
10.3152/030234207x228584. Accessed 18 July 2019. 
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After the establishment of the EPA in 1970, the theory behind emissions markets 
continued to be developed further in the United States. Several papers on the subject of 
market externalities and incentive-based emissions reduction were written at this time, and 
would come to establish much of the foundation for future practical implementation of the 
economic theory behind emissions trading.12 As a definitive policy measure, however, the 
emissions market instrument did not become explicitly and firmly realized until the 1977 
revision of the 1963 Clean Air Act13, under which firms were permitted to collect a kind of 
proto-emissions certificate from the federal government in exchange for buying out 
competitors’ industrial pollution.14 Voß calls this the second, or “Proof of Principle” stage, 
at which the emissions trading system was functionally implemented (albeit on a rather minor 
level) in a practical, real world setting.15 
The United States continued to lead the development of environmental economics 
policy into the 1990s. In 1990, the US Congress passed a suite of further amendments to the 
Clean Air Act, one of which contained the framework for the world’s first so-called “cap-
and-trade” legislation.16 The new law, which was designed to address disappointing results 
in combating sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions under previous CAA iterations, 
established new protocols under which these acid rain-causing pollutants could be regulated 
on a market certificate system.17 Allowances for sulfur dioxide and similar pollutants were 
sold by the overseeing EPA, and a total nationwide cap was established.18 The system proved 
resoundingly successful, swiftly cutting sulfur dioxide below half 1980 levels by 1995.19 
By the mid-1990s, climate change had become a political issue, and the scientific 
12 Coase, R. H. “The Problem of Social Cost.” The Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 3, Oct. 1960, pp. 1–
44, 10.1086/466560. Accessed 16 July 2019. 
13 United States Environmental Protection Agency. “Evolution of the Clean Air Act | US EPA.” US EPA, 21 
Nov. 2018, www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act. 
14 Voß, Jan-Peter. “Innovation Processes in Governance: The Development of ‘Emissions Trading’ as a New 
Policy Instrument.” Science and Public Policy, vol. 34, no. 5, 1 June 2007, pp. 329–343, 
10.3152/030234207x228584. Accessed 18 July 2019. 
15 ibid 
16 US EPA,OAR. “1990 Clean Air Act Amendment Summary | US EPA.” US EPA, 21 Nov. 2018, 
www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/1990-clean-air-act-amendment-summary. Accessed 10 July 2019. 
17 Voß, Jan-Peter. “Innovation Processes in Governance: The Development of ‘Emissions Trading’ as a New 
Policy Instrument.” Science and Public Policy, vol. 34, no. 5, 1 June 2007, pp. 329–343, 
10.3152/030234207x228584. Accessed 18 July 2019. 
18 ibid 
19 ibid 
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consensus on its anthropogenic roots was emerging as consensus.20 Consequently, 
politicians, economists, and scientists began seriously considering an array of policies at the 
macroeconomic level that might arrest or at least ameliorate the developing problem of 
runaway greenhouse gas emissions. Having proven successful at managing the acid rain crisis 
in the United States, the emissions market scheme would gain traction by the turn of the 
century as a potentially applicable (and more importantly, politically viable) policy response 
to climate change. Although the structure of such a market applied to a swathe of emissions 
sectors rather than a single pollutant class would necessitate significant refinements to the 
design of emissions trading schemes, the potential long-term reductions to net emissions 
without significant economic disruption made the concept appealing enough to see political 
daylight in the European Union.21 
2005 saw the official rollout of the European Union Emissions Trading System, or 
“EU ETS”. Shortly after its establishment, the new EU emissions market included roughly 
one-half of the European Union’s CO2 emissions, and roughly 40% of its net greenhouse gas 
emissions. The latter half of this thesis will focus in depth on the European Union and 
Chinese emissions trading systems, and will take into account the history of and approaches 
undertaken by both schemes. But it would be inaccurate to imply that emissions markets have 
been limited to those two polities; across the globe, dozens of emissions trading systems exist 
as of 2019. The most prominent of these, besides the EU ETS and China’s emissions market, 
are in Australia, South Korea, and certain states of the USA, notably California.22 Though 
none approach the scale of the EU or Chinese ETS ambitions, they do represent a general 
trend towards emissions trading as an increasingly popular and viable mechanism for use 
across a diverse array of political systems, national economies, and regions. On occasion, 
this paper may note certain similarities or differences between the subject emissions markets 
and these other emissions markets that have been highlighted by researchers in the cited 
documents on institutional design.       In order to 
20 Oreskes, Naomi. “The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change.” Science, vol. 306, no. 5702, 2 Dec. 2004, 
pp. 1686–1686, www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/306/5702/1686.pdf, 10.1126/science.1103618. Accessed 11 
July 2019. 
21 Voß, Jan-Peter. “Innovation Processes in Governance: The Development of ‘Emissions Trading’ as a New 
Policy Instrument.” Science and Public Policy, vol. 34, no. 5, 1 June 2007, pp. 329–343, 
10.3152/030234207x228584. Accessed 18 July 2019. 
22 OECD (2002), Implementing Domestic Tradeable Permits: Recent Developments and Future Challenges, 
OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264191983-en. 
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facilitate an effective comparison between the European Union and Chinese emissions 
trading systems, it is important to first describe a number of fundamental issues at the core 
of institutional design of emissions trading systems. While each of the following points is 
applicable to the topics evaluated in the later portions of this thesis, they are in turn further 
applicable to emissions markets in general, and even to the developing international ambition 
of global carbon market linkages. For this reason, the experiences of the European Union, 
China, and other developing emissions trading systems in applying and testing the 
approaches to emissions markets’ institutional design will likely prove invaluable to states 
and international organizations who in the future might seek to establish emissions trading 
systems of their own. 
II. Emissions Market Designs
Emissions trading schemes, in simplest terms, are fundamentally a means of reducing 
emissions via market mechanisms at the lowest possible cost. In their 2012 paper on the 
subject, titled “Designing Emissions Trading in Practice”, Dr. Peter Heindl and Dr. Andreas 
Löschel of the Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research note that emissions markets 
can be a “counterpart”, in many ways, to the prototypical Pigouvian tax (which may not 
assign costs and benefits to optimal degrees of efficiency).23 That is to say, in an emissions 
trading system, the destructive relevant collective outcomes (in this case, the negative effects 
of greenhouse gas emissions on global and local climate) are minimized via policy 
implementation, and applied more fairly to the initiators of said social costs – greenhouse gas 
emitters – rather than remaining disconnected and applicable exclusively to the everyday 
taxpayer when the deleterious consequences of climate change take place. By establishing a 
scarce resource in emitted greenhouse gas pollution, cost – and therefore, negative incentive 
– is applied directly where it had been previously avoided: at the source, with the polluter.24
It should be noted that emissions market systems are distinct in important ways from 
23 Heindl, Peter, and Andreas Löschel. “Designing Emissions Trading in Practice - General Considerations 
and Experiences from the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).” SSRN Electronic Journal, vol. 12, no. 
009, 2012, 10.2139/ssrn.2014666. Accessed 21 July 2019. 
24 Haites, Erik, et al. “Experience with Carbon Taxes and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Systems.” 
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018, scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1358&context=delpf, 
10.2139/ssrn.3119241. Accessed 6 Aug. 2019. 
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carbon taxes or emissions taxes. There is no tax directly applied to greenhouse gas emissions 
under a typical emissions trading scheme (though carbon taxation can exist in parallel). In a 
carbon tax system, the government charges a definite, standardized percentage of calculated 
cost directly to the emitter, at the time the pollution is created.25 There are certain advantages 
to this approach, namely the immediate creation of a calculable negative incentive that is 
easily applied to emissions at all levels within the economy, entirely independent of scale. 
But carbon taxation struggles in certain other regards, where it is outmatched by emissions 
markets. For one, emissions trading schemes offer a level of flexibility that make them much 
less politically volatile, since in principle individual emitters might not be required to make 
any immediate changes whatsoever, depending on how certificates are allocated across a 
national economy’s various sectors and which sectors are prioritized by a particular 
government for emissions reduction. Additionally, in a market system, emitters may have 
access to “recycled” certificates (either purchased directly from other emitters or via third-
party mechanisms, such as those of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change26), cheaper options for purchasing emissions certificates via the market mechanism, 
and even – though controversial – “grandfathered” permits, freely allocated without cost at 
the prerogative of the relevant national government.27 
Carbon taxes, by contrast, present emitters with a flat cost that must be paid, limiting 
strategic behavior. It should be noted that both carbon taxes and carbon markets are 
considered effective by economists.28 Both mechanisms manage and incentivize healthy 
social behavior of polluters, encourage technological innovation, and measurably decrease 
emissions over time. It also possible, and in fact common, for an economy to make use of a 
hybrid system, taking elements of both carbon taxes and emissions trading schema. Several 
European Union Member States, France notably among them, make use of carbon taxes in 
25 Heindl, Peter, and Andreas Löschel. “Designing Emissions Trading in Practice - General Considerations 
and Experiences from the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).” SSRN Electronic Journal, vol. 12, no. 
009, 2012, 10.2139/ssrn.2014666. Accessed 21 July 2019 
26 International Energy Agency. Emissions Trading and CDM (Archived). 2014, 
web.archive.org/web/20160101222214/www.iea.org/topics/climatechange/subtopics/emissionstradingandcdm
/. 
27 Neelis, Maarten, et al. Developing Benchmarking Criteria for CO2 Emissions. Ecofys Netherlands, The 
Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research, 2009. 
28 Haites, Erik, et al. “Experience with Carbon Taxes and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Systems.” 
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018, scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1358&context=delpf, 
10.2139/ssrn.3119241. Accessed 6 Aug. 2019. 
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addition to their participation in the EU ETS.29 The very brief comparison between the two 
systems here is not a value judgment so much as an evaluation of the political, economic, 
and social challenges and advantages of implementing either. 
In practice, all emissions trading systems make use of one fundamental mechanism: 
the quantity restriction, or the “cap”. In order to apply scarcity to emissions, this cap is 
established prior to a designated trading period, and reduced – generally in a linear fashion, 
though not always – over time. As described previously, emissions certificates, which are 
tied precisely to a particular quantity of pollution, are distributed – allocated – by the relevant 
national authority to emitters in the covered economic sectors. These certificates must be 
returned to the overseeing authority by a predetermined deadline, and must be verified 
against observed and recorded emissions in order to prevent fraud. 30 But most important in 
developing the institutional design of a carbon market is establishing the specific operative 
goal of the emissions trading system itself. While an emissions trading system can be reliably 
expected to encourage technological development, push emitters towards cleaner alternatives 
to production, and properly allocate costs from pollution onto the responsible parties31, the 
degree to which it achieves each of these goals is determined by the configuration of its 
institutional design. Designating particular ambitions, therefore, is necessary from the 
beginning. Several guiding questions that must be answered during the design stage of an 
ETS are mentioned in the World Bank’s 2016 paper “Emissions Trading in Practice”32 (not 
to be confused with the similarly-titled paper by Professors Heindl and Löschel referenced 
earlier): 
29 Lucas, Barbara. “The Carbon Tax That Keeps On Giving | Energy Policy Institute at University of 
Chicago.” Uchicago.Edu, Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago, 2019, 
epic.uchicago.edu/news-events/news/carbon-tax-keeps-giving. Accessed 18 July 2019. 
30 Heindl, Peter, and Andreas Löschel. “Designing Emissions Trading in Practice - General Considerations 
and Experiences from the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).” SSRN Electronic Journal, vol. 12, no. 
009, 2012, 10.2139/ssrn.2014666. Accessed 21 July 2019. 
31 ibid 
32 Kerr, Suzi; Lubowski, Ruben; Ward, John; Marijs, Cor; Sammon, Paul; Guigon, Pierre; Haug, Constanze; 
Acworth, William; Leining, Catherine; Murphy, Leah; Wagner, Gernot; Rittenhouse, Katherine; Mehling, 
Michael Arthur; Matthes, Felix Christian; Duan, Maosheng. 2016. “Emissions trading in practice: a handbook 
on design and implementation” (English). Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/353821475849138788/Emissions-trading-in-practice-a-handbook-
on-design-and-implementation  
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● How much of a particular economy’s emissions reduction goals are intended
to be met by the emissions trading system, as opposed to some other
mechanism or policy initiatives undertaken by other means?
● How are the benefits of the emissions trading system distributed? How are the
costs distributed?
● What level of economic cost is acceptable, as the effects of the emissions
market ripple through the economy?
● If the emissions trading system collects revenue via government auction of
permits, certificates, or allowances, how will that revenue be distributed?
● At what rate should decarbonization be attempted? Are there particular clean
energy or abatement goals that the ETS much play a role in meeting?
● By how much should the government (or overseeing body) restrict the yearly
sale of emissions certificates? Should this percentage increase over time, or
should it remain steady?
● Will the emissions trading scheme make use of third-party or international-
level emissions reduction initiatives, such as the Clean Development
Mechanism of the United Nations Framework Committee on Climate
Change? If so, will emitters be permitted to directly interface with these
mechanisms, or will the overseeing body act as an intermediary?
● What local economic or political concerns exist that may limit or enhance the
effectiveness of the emissions trading system? Are there particular concerns
about economic viability or existing (and potentially overlapping) energy
transition policies that could complicate the implementation of a new ETS?33
Allocation, and the methods by which allocation is carried out, are critical to the 
success of an emissions market. During the initial operative period of an emissions trading 
scheme, governments must designate permits or certificates in a formalized fashion that is 
both fair to the participants and creates equal incentive to reduce emissions across the board, 
without additional weight given to particular industries or sectors. According to the 
International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP), an international organization that 
specializes in carbon market policy and emissions trading institutional design, there are 
33 ibid 
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several approaches to the question of how allocations for emissions should be distributed. 
One, auctioning, is the most closely tied to the market mechanism, in that it is affected by 
shifts in the price of emissions.34 As ICAP’s 2019 paper “The Use of Auction Revenue from 
Emissions Trading Systems: Delivering Environmental, Economic, and Social Benefits” 
notes, auctioning is a good way to tie an emissions trading scheme directly to politics, as the 
funds from auctioning can be easily distributed into the government revenue stream. This 
effectively produces a consistent source of state income, towards which politicians seeking 
public approval for emissions trading systems can point to demonstrate not just the promised 
ecological effects, which may be more difficult to observe, but a clear source of funding for 
other state endeavors.35 ICAP’s paper also notes that “reinvestment of auction proceeds can 
generate jobs and economic benefits directly to local economies” – some, undoubtedly, in 
the covered sectors themselves.36 
Auctioning allowances, as opposed to other methods of distribution, has a number of 
direct benefits to the efficiency of the market mechanism as well. Unlike other methods, such 
as freely allocating certificates to emitters, auctioning the allowances ensures that emitters 
are forced to absorb some cost: either purchasing the certificates, or investing in their 
operations to abate emissions.37 This maintains the incentive-based mechanic that is core to 
the idea behind emissions trading from the beginning of the process. Additionally, auctioning 
allowances has been shown to be more effective at ensuring that the emitters who use the 
most certificates are able to obtain them.38 It prevents misallocation by free distribution, 
through which an emitter might provide incorrect data and be assigned too many or too few 
certificates by mistake – or worse, by an intentional attempt to circumvent the market system. 
Through auction, no such opportunities for misallocation arise, as emitters are legally bound 
to pay the cost of emissions, one way or another. Finally, auctioning avoids the problem of 
special interest, in which even a well-meaning government may over-allocate or under-
allocate to a particular sector on account of some incorrect perception of that sector’s relative 
34 Santikarn, M., Kardish, C., Ackva, J. & Haug, C. (2019). The Use of Auction Revenue from Emissions 
Trading Systems: Delivering Environmental, Economic, and Social Benefits. Berlin: ICAP 
35 ibid 
36 ibid 
37 Neelis, Maarten, et al. Developing Benchmarking Criteria for CO2 Emissions. Ecofys Netherlands, The 
Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research, 2009. 
38 Santikarn, M., Kardish, C., Ackva, J. & Haug, C. (2019). The Use of Auction Revenue from Emissions 
Trading Systems: Delivering Environmental, Economic, and Social Benefits. Berlin: ICAP 
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contribution to the economy, political popularity, or prior degree of abatement. Auctioning 
allowances circumvents this problem, ensuring emitters purchase exactly as many emissions 
certificates as they need, and no more.39 
But other methods of allocation exist, and have certain advantages as well. Most 
systems make use of a combination of methods to distribute emissions certificates. One of 
these is benchmarking, or the process of evaluating emitters based on prior emissions, and 
allocating emissions permits based on observed historical trends.40 This is a difficult task, 
and requires robust systemic observation and reliable, up-to-date record-keeping, as well as 
firm policy implements to ensure policy connection to allocation once the data is collected. 
In 2009, the European Commission’s Environment Directorate-General sponsored a study 
entitled “Developing Benchmarking Criteria for CO2 Emissions”.41 The authors – 
researchers at Ecofys Netherlands and the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation 
Research – proposed eleven key “allocation principles that could form the basis for a 
benchmark-based allocation methodology”.42 The full paper describes each in detail, includes 
a great deal of supplemental data, and it is useful for an overview of the subject to describe 
each here briefly. 
● The first and eighth principles concern the benchmark level – the level at
which permit allocation for emissions is determined. According to the
Commission paper, benchmarks should be “based on the most energy efficient
technology”. Essentially, the development of new technologies should not
interfere with the ultimate aim of the emissions market to incentivize
emissions reduction. At no point should emitters find it cost-effective to cease
innovating. Additionally, technology should play a role in establishing new
benchmarks for particular fuels.
● The second, third, fourth, and seventh principles concern benchmarking
details; namely, that one should not overemphasize such details. Distinctions
between older and newer technologies (except where there concern the first
39 ibid 
40 Törner, Anna, et al. Benchmarking in the EU: Lessions from the EU Emissions Trading System for the 
Global Climate Change Agenda. Center for European Policy Studies, 2010, www.ceps.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2010/06/TFBenchmarking11062010.pdf. 
41 Neelis, Maarten, et al. Developing Benchmarking Criteria for CO2 Emissions. Ecofys Netherlands, The 
Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research, 2009. 
42 ibid 
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principle), age or size of facilities, climate, or fuel type – among others – 
complicate the ability of the allocation body to make fair allocation decisions, 
and limit the efficiency of the emissions trading system once allocated. 
● The fifth and sixth principles address the issue of product differentiation. In
keeping with the overall theme of limiting divergence and granularity of
benchmark allocation, the Commission researchers urge emissions market
system operators not to use separate benchmarks for different products unless
those products are “traded between installations”, or have “verifiable
production data [...] based on unambiguous and justifiable product
classifications”.
● Principles nine and ten urge allocation authorities to “use historical production
to allocate allowances”, and to rely on existing (and “product-specific”)
methods of data collection and storage to determine benchmark allocations,
in order to facilitate allocation that is as closely tied to relevant production
numbers as possible.
● Finally, the eleventh principle concerns the issue of insufficient data. In this
eventuality, the authors recommend that auction authorities create a “generic
efficiency improvement factor for heat consumption” together with an
existing benchmark for heat production in order to generate a benchmark that
can substitute for one missing enough data to be generated via standard
means.43
As these eleven principles make apparent, monitoring emitters and properly 
allocating emissions certificates is a difficult, but potentially valuable and effective means of 
emissions reduction. Beyond these eleven principles, governments have a number of options 
by which they can approach allocation. Allocating certificates corresponding on historical 
emissions, otherwise known as “grandfathering”, is one such method, and is undoubtedly the 
simplest. In a grandfathered system, the allocation authority will distribute emissions credits 
according to historical emissions by sector or by individual emitter. This has benefit of 
relying on data that in most cases exists already, requiring no further administrative burden 
to observe further activity. Additionally, since it distributes allocation towards those 
43 ibid 
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industries and emitters which have historically produced the highest levels of emission, in 
principle it also connects those emitters more directly to the new emissions trading 
mechanism, and incentivizes them to take part in the market with the credits they have been 
allocated.44 
However, grandfathering of allocations has significant drawbacks as well. As noted 
by the Commission’s aforementioned paper on allocation as a policy tool, grandfathering of 
emissions certificate allocation can complicate or even damage the effectiveness of an 
emissions trading system. For one, grandfathering allocation risks “rewarding high historic 
emissions, rather than early action”45 – in effect, rather than incentivizing participation, 
higher shares of emissions allocations might instead incentivize inaction in terms of 
emissions market participation and in technological development. Secondly, grandfathering 
makes it very difficult to accommodate differences in markets when multiple countries or 
regions (the Commission paper makes note of Member States of the EU in particular)46 are 
covered by the same market scheme. There is little to prevent a larger market’s highest-
emitting industries from absorbing the bulk of emissions allocation for a particular state in a 
purely grandfathered allocation system. Additionally, should new a country or region enter 
the coverage zone of the emissions market, there is be no way to seamlessly connect its 
industries to the grandfathered allocation system. Finally, the concern of windfall profits 
looms largest over grandfathering allocations as a significant issue. Should an emitter with 
high historic emissions decide to shift the “costs” of free allowances onward to consumers, 
the emission market becomes merely a way to justify increased prices for the emitter, and a 
source of potentially-volatile political backlash against the emissions trading system itself, 
which allowed the price distortion to take place.47  
Because the risk of these distinctly unfavorable outcomes is fairly significant in a 
traditionally-allocated “grandfathered” system, the Commission-sponsored paper proposed 
alternative approaches for use in the later phases of the EU emissions trading system. They 
44 Törner, Anna, et al. Benchmarking in the EU: Lessions from the EU Emissions Trading System for the 
Global Climate Change Agenda. Center for European Policy Studies, 2010, www.ceps.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2010/06/TFBenchmarking11062010.pdf. 
45 Neelis, Maarten, et al. Developing Benchmarking Criteria for CO2 Emissions. Ecofys Netherlands, The 
Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research, 2009. 
46 ibid 
47 Törner, Anna, et al. Benchmarking in the EU: Lessions from the EU Emissions Trading System for the 
Global Climate Change Agenda. Center for European Policy Studies, 2010, www.ceps.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2010/06/TFBenchmarking11062010.pdf. 
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are, however, universally applicable to emissions market certificate allocation policy in 
general. One of these, of course, is to reduce the number of total free allocations, and shift 
towards an increased emphasis on auctioning instead. The Commission paper’s authors list 
a number of reasons for such a shift,48 referencing a number of the advantages described 
earlier in overviewing allocations auctioning. In addition, they urge a general shift towards a 
system more reliant on benchmarking than on grandfathering.49 The definition for the former 
term is specific in this context, and here described as “the comparison of performance (with 
respect to greenhouse gas emissions) against peers”.50 The emission benchmark, thereafter, 
is expressed as “a predefined value for the specific emissions for a certain activity” which 
“can be differentiated by products, fuels, and technologies.”51 The specifics of the complex 
systems involved with benchmarking (and the Commission researchers’ thorough analysis 
of the topic) are too complex to explore in this thesis. Indeed, the Commission paper itself 
calls the process of establishing a benchmarking system “complicated and demanding”.52 
Nevertheless, a few conclusions in particular are relevant here. First, use of benchmarking – 
in accordance with the eleven principles laid out earlier in this section – is a preferable 
approach to free allocation than grandfathering, and potentially a preferable approach to 
auctioning, if well executed. The main challenges, according to the research, are ensuring: 
• “Availability of all data required for all sectors, all products, and all Member
States” (the latter qualifier, of course, being specific to the EU ETS or other
multinational emissions trading systems).
• “The quality of the required data and the possibility for (independent)
verification and monitoring.”
• “The confidentiality of the data and the resulting need for an independent
entity governing the data without disclosing details.”53
Should governments and/or allocation authorities be capable of achieving each of these, 
however, the Commission researchers argue that “a transparent and applicable benchmark-
48 Neelis, Maarten, et al. Developing Benchmarking Criteria for CO2 Emissions. Ecofys Netherlands, The 
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based allocation methodology can be developed and that no a-priori bottlenecks exist in 
developing such methodology”.54 
Unlike the suite of advantages offered by auctioning, emissions certificate allocation 
instead holds to the single major advantage that it ensures a high level of direct policy control 
over the process of emissions allocation. In so doing, governments and regulatory authorities 
maintain a firm grasp on the fundamental functions of the emissions trading scheme, and 
may influence its outcomes and starting positions based on interests that may not be strictly 
economic. This can, of course, be good or bad for the effectiveness of the emissions trading 
system, depending on the changes made and the reliability of the allocation methods in 
question.  
The World Bank, alongside the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), authored a specific framework for carbon pricing mechanisms that 
succinctly covers the various mechanisms and points above. Named the “FASTER 
Principles”, these points serve as aspirational guiding markers for carbon trading systems in 
their infancy:55 
● “Fairness” – an understanding of and responsiveness to the unequitable
sources of emissions, that “[distributes] costs and benefits equitably, avoiding
disproportionate burdens on vulnerable groups”, along the lines of the so-
called Polluter Pays principle.
● “Alignment (of policies and objectives)” – the carbon market should not only
act as a mechanism for emissions reduction in a vacuum, but also as a general-
use tool for inciting positive outcomes in areas of policy interest across many
fields and healthy market responsiveness to the ongoing industrial changes.
● “Stability (and predictability) – the emissions trading system should engender
trust and confidence in the general public, private industry, and politicians, in
order to “give a consistent, credible, and strong investment signal, whose
intensity should increase over time”.
54 ibid 
55 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank Group (WBG). 
The FASTER Principles for Successful Carbon Pricing: Public Disclosure Authorized. 2015. 
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● “Transparency” – the market mechanism should be easily comprehensible, its
operations open, and its goals public.
● “Efficiency (and cost-effectiveness)” – the market mechanism is intended to
reduce and minimize the costs of emissions reduction; over time, it should
stimulate an increase in economic efficiency.
● “Reliability (and environmental integrity)” – the success of the trading system
must be measurable not just degrees of abatement and economic adaptation,
but in quantifiable “reduction[s] in environmentally harmful behavior”.56
The FASTER principles are very general, but they encapsulate much of the main 
considerations involved in designing emissions trading systems. Though the World Bank and 
OECD designed the principles for usage in developing economies, the FASTER basics are 
applicable near-universally, and its goals are shared by all emissions trading systems, 
including those in developed economies. 
A final consideration worth briefly mentioning is the steady, and to some degree 
unconscious, march towards a global market for emissions. The proliferation of emissions 
trading as a policy tool across much of the world in the past decade has resulted in the gradual 
development of a competitive market that crosses ETS boundaries.57 A multinational 
corporation, for example, may need to participate in different emissions markets in different 
parts of the world, potentially facing different costs in each. In order to prevent imbalances 
in this worldwide global emissions market, it is in the interest of the authorities behind 
existing emissions trading systems to consider linkages between the domestic system and 
foreign ones. This is, of course, a complicated task in both the political and economic sense, 
but there are some frameworks for linkages that can be useful to policy-makers looking to 
connect their mechanisms to a more global market. In the specific cases of the European 
Union ETS and the Chinese ETS, these considerations would likely be of particular 
importance, given the sheer scale of both systems relative to the rest of the world, and the 
accordingly large influence each has in the developing and informal global market for 
emissions. 
56 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank Group (WBG). 
The FASTER Principles for Successful Carbon Pricing: Public Disclosure Authorized. 2015. 
57 Wara, Michael. “Is the Global Carbon Market Working?” Nature, vol. 445, no. 7128, Feb. 2007, pp. 595–
596, www.nature.com/articles/445595a.pdf, 10.1038/445595a. Accessed 9 Aug. 2019. 
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According to the paper “Joint Emissions Trading as a Socio-Ecological 
Transformation”, published jointly in 2006 by the German Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research (BMBF) and a number of independent researchers, there are several “critical design 
issues” that are integral to linkage of domestic emissions trading schemes.58 Unlike questions 
of domestic institutional design, international linkages of emissions trading systems are not 
hindered by differences in sector coverage, since competition across trading regimes would 
occur regardless of whether or not the trading regimes in question were linked.59 In fact, the 
BMBF argues that “differences in sector coverage may actually have a positive effect on 
economic efficiency, since the cost savings emissions trading achieves stem from the 
differences in emissions abatement cost among the participants.”60 While coverage is not a 
limiting factor for emissions trading system linkages, however, other details are very 
important indeed. For one, trading units, and their standardization and recognition across 
ETS boundaries, are core to linkage. Differences in policy – concerning, for example, 
acceptance of third-party emissions credits from the United Nations Clean Development 
Mechanism – can become sticking points in a hypothetical linkage mechanism. Additional 
questions can arise concerning the details of scheme targets (i.e. whether the linked market 
seeks to impose absolute caps, such as the EU ETS, or restrict emissions intensity, such as 
the Chinese system), as well as in disparities in monitoring, penalties for violators, and 
banking allowances.61  
Of course, talk of linkages on a global scale, especially between the EU ETS and such 
a newly-established system as the Chinese ETS, is aspirational at best in 2019. Currently, the 
only major emissions system linkage is that between the EU and the Swiss ETS.62 
Nevertheless, the challenges associated with the issue should undoubtedly be considered 
ahead of time at the institutional design level. Over time, as a global emissions market comes 
into existence naturally via development of emissions trading systems (linked or otherwise), 
it would be to the benefit of emissions trading system operators to have frameworks and 
58 Sterk, Wolfgang, et al. JET-SET: Joint Emissions Trading as a Socio-Ecological Transformation Cross-
Section Project 4 “Ready to Link Up? Implications of Design Differences for Linking Domestic Emissions 
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mechanisms in place for the inevitable push towards linkage with other systems. After all, 
the overall efficiency improvements achieved when emissions trading systems become 
linked make the goal of a worldwide system of emissions market linkages a worthwhile one 
indeed. For now, however, the world’s emissions trading systems must firmly establish 
themselves as pillars of the international effort to combat climate change and fulfill the 
objectives of the Paris Agreement. 
III. The EU ETS
The European Union first implemented its emissions trading scheme in 2005. 
Officially the “European Union Emissions Trading System”, the EU ETS was the first 
emissions trading system of significant scale ever established.63 At the time of its 
implementation, the EU ETS included all twenty-four of the then-Member States of the 
European Union – including, notably, the United Kingdom, which since 2002 had run its 
own limited national emissions trading scheme.64 Upon rollout, roughly forty percent of total 
CO2 emissions EU wide were included in the market mechanism, with a goal to increase this 
proportion over time. Officially, this included all of the following sectors in the participating 
Member States: 
● All “energy activities” – (defined by the EU as combustion installations with
a thermal input above twenty megawatts, coke ovens, and mineral oil
refineries)
● Ferrous metals production
● “Mineral industries”, including ceramics, cement, and glass
● All “pulp, paper, and board activities”65
63 “EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS).” European Commission, 23 Nov. 2016, 
ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en. Accessed 10 Aug. 2019. 
64 ENVIROS Consulting Ltd. “Appraisal of Years 1-4 of the UK Emissions Trading Scheme (Archived).” 
United Kingdom National Archives, 2006, 
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090807041040/www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/trading
/uk/pdf/ukets1-4yr-appraisal.pdf. Accessed 5 Aug. 2019. 
65 “BBC NEWS | Science & Environment | Q&A: Europe’s Carbon Trading Scheme.” Bbc.Co.Uk, 2015, 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4114921.stm. Accessed 6 Aug. 2019. 
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Notably excluded from the initial version of the Emissions Trading System were 
aviation emissions and automotive emissions. Although aviation only accounted for three 
percent of EU emissions in 2002, the sector was then (and remains) the fastest-growing of 
all emissions sectors, but by 2017 still only made up 2% of the total transportation emissions 
share.66 
The EU ETS was designed as a staged rollout, to take place over designated (pre-
determined) “trading periods”. Each of the three trading periods to date has been designed 
with the intention of managing the specific details of the ETS scheme in a responsive, 
experimental way.67 To some extent, this tentative approach to institutional design is a 
positive feature that enhances the emissions market’s ability to create responsive policy. 
However, the staged rollout has also faced criticism that its style of implementation is in fact 
a constraining factor in the trading scheme’s ability to successfully achieve its goals of 
general across-the-board emissions reduction.68 Either way, one indisputable benefit of the 
phased approach to emissions market design is that administration of the market scheme has 
been able to decisively respond with needed adjustments in response to crises, rather than 
being limited to gradual adjustments over time. 
The first trading period of the EU emissions market took place between the system’s 
establishment in 2005 and the end of 2007. During Phase I, the EU ETS was rolled out to the 
then-24 Member States via the new allocation scheme, and participants (public and private) 
were immediately able to begin direct transactions and market buying and selling. These 
allocations were handled via free allocation in the basic grandfathering fashion, which would 
come to have significant consequences.69 Since the EU ETS is a multinational emissions 
trading system that relies on the participation of individual national government in order to 
function, each participating Member State handled its domestic allocation process via 
66 European Environment Agency. “Annual European Union Greenhouse Gas Inventory 1990–2017 and 
Inventory Report 2019.” European Environment Agency, 2017, www.eea.europa.eu/publications/european-
union-greenhouse-gas-inventory-2019. Accessed 4 Aug. 2019. 
67 ---. “European Commission - PRESS RELEASES  - Press Release - Questions and Answers on the Revised 
EU Trading System.” Europa.Eu, 2012, europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-796_en.htm. Accessed 11 
Aug. 2019. 
68 Teeter, Preston, and Jörgen Sandberg. “Constraining or Enabling Green Capability Development? How 
Policy Uncertainty Affects Organizational Responses to Flexible Environmental Regulations.” British Journal 
of Management, vol. 28, no. 4, 6 Sept. 2016, pp. 649–665, 10.1111/1467-8551.12188. Accessed 2 Aug. 2019. 
69 “BBC NEWS | Science & Environment | Q&A: Europe’s Carbon Trading Scheme.” Bbc.Co.Uk, 2015, 
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National Allocation Plan, which, as previously noted, relied on the European Commission to 
approve or send back.70 The framework by which the Commission evaluated these plans, the 
2003 Emission Trading Directive, was focused on ensuring compliance with the 
responsibilities of states under the Kyoto Protocol, but included additional restrictions in 
order to ensure intra-EU fairness, proper infrastructure for monitoring, reporting, and 
verification, and a mechanism for penalization of violations.71 
Phase I faced significant challenges, however. Most significantly for the market, the 
emissions certificate allocation system had over-allocated allowances to several EU 
countries: Belgium, Czech Republic, France, the Netherlands, and Spain. All six countries 
were granted more emissions tonnage in emissions certificates than their domestic emitters 
had actually produced during the first two years of Phase I.72 Effectively, this outcome meant 
that the market scheme not only failed to restrict net emissions for these countries during 
Phase I, but it also failed to incentivize transition to alternative energy sources, since emitters 
were able to produce their expected tonnage without even reaching the certificate limit. This 
over-allocation and the subsequent market response led to a fall in the price of carbon 
certificates, as the abundance of the ostensibly scarce “resource” became apparent to ETS 
market participants. By 2007, market price for carbon had sunk as low as €0.10 per ton, down 
from a peak of €29.20 in 2006 (before the over-allocation was discovered).73 
Emissions among the twenty-four Member States participating recorded a net rise of 
just under two percent.74 (Bulgaria, Malta, and Romania were not recorded in Phase I, since 
they did not join the European Union until 2007). While it was unclear from the beginning 
of its rollout if Phase I of the ETS would in fact reduce emissions, the failure of the Phase I 
trading scheme to make a significant effect on the general long term trend line of business-
as-usual emissions made re-examination of the entire endeavor a priority, both at the 
70 European Commission. “National Allocation Plans.” European Commission, 23 Nov. 2016, 
ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/pre2013/nap_en. 
71 European Commission. Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
October 2003 Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading within the Community 
and Amending Council Directive 96/61/EC. 25 Oct. 2003, eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32003L0087. Accessed 22 July 2019. 
72 Buchner, Barbara K., and A. Denny Ellerman. “Over-Allocation or Abatement? A Preliminary Analysis of 
the EU ETS Based on the 2005 Emissions Data.” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2006, 10.2139/ssrn.946091. 
Accessed 19 July 2019. 
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European Union’s institutional level and in the policy responses of the participating Member 
Countries.75 Phase I was not an outright failure, and some abatement did take place, 
amounting to roughly 2.8% of the projected European Union emissions had the emissions 
trading scheme not been implemented.76 Additionally, the late discovery of the over-
allocation problem underscored the vital importance of accurate data collection for proper 
utilization of the emissions market scheme, especially given the vast difference between the 
target degree of Phase I emissions reduction – 12.7% – and the actual outcome of barely a 
fifth that percentage.        
 Professors Barry Anderson of University College Dublin and Corrado Di Mari of 
Queen’s University Belfast write, in their paper “Abatement and Allocation in the Pilot Phase 
of the EU ETS”, that there are three “key elements for the success of an emissions trading 
scheme”, based on their evaluation of the outcomes from Phase I: 
● Trustworthy data 
● Centralization of the allocation process (in Anderson and Di Mari’s words, 
“top-down” cap-setting) 
● A large amount of auctioning of emissions certificates, in contrast to higher 
degrees of direct transactions, which “[limit] the possibility of windfall gains 
for the participants in the scheme, […] reducing strategic behavior and rent-
seeking.”77 
The first phase of the EU ETS struggled to achieve all three of these elements. While 
emissions data was reliably transmitted and recorded, it was not sufficiently collected and 
collated in time to prevent the late discovery of the significant over-allocation issues. While 
centralization of the allocation process was “top-down” in principle, since the EU 
Commission approved the final apportionment, there was no real pressure from the “limited” 
allocations to incite true emissions reduction. Indeed, the grandfathered approach to free 
allocations meant that incentives actually worked to some extent in the opposite direction, 
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with firms seeing opportunities to pass along costs rather than innovate.78 Finally, while some 
auctioning did take place, a concerning number of direct transactions took place, leading to 
accusations of insider knowledge and high-level misconduct to take advantage of blind spots 
in the distribution scheme of the ETS.79 
This final point is worth additional attention in particular, since certain institutional 
weaknesses of the early EU ETS were critical gaps through which unintended – and 
potentially malicious – behavior were allowed to take place. Because there was little focus 
on the market mechanism (as opposed to the direct transfers), emitters sold their certificates 
in bulk, all at once, creating “windfall profits” that further drove down the price of carbon 
under the mechanism.80 This was specifically a consequence of the allocation method in 
particular, since the Phase I allocation was done mostly via grandfathered free allocation. 
The incentives for emissions reduction, as a consequence of these institutional shortcomings, 
were thus significantly reduced from their optimal state, and Phase I outcomes were similarly 
limited in effectiveness. 
Phase II of the EU ETS began in the shadow of Phase I’s mistakes and lessons, but 
on the whole enjoyed more success than the pilot trading period. During Phase II, which 
lasted from 2008 through the end of 2012, the 24 originally participating Member States were 
joined by the three new Member States of the European Union – Bulgaria, Malta, and 
Romania – as well as by three participating non-members: Iceland, Liechtenstein, and 
Norway81. The new additions brought the total number of participating countries to 30. 
Additionally, Phase II was the first to include the new rules of the so-called “Linking 
Directive” from the European Commission, which allowed Member States participating in 
the EU ETS to make use of United Nations Clean Development Mechanism and Joint 
Implementation credits as part of their ETS market participation and legal allocations.82  The 
Commission decided that Phase II would also be the first to include aviation emissions in the 
78 EUROPEAN COMMISSION Directorate -General for Climate Action. EVALUATION OF THE EU ETS 
DIRECTIVE Carried out within the Project “Support for the Review of the EU Emissions Trading System.” 
2015. 
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emissions allocation system, a politically sensitive decision that resulted in hostile reactions 
from both international airline corporations and from other countries – notably China and the 
United States – who felt that applying EU-level emissions restrictions to international carriers 
was a violation of international law.83 Chinese financial pressure and American legal pressure 
resulted in a retreat from full inclusion of the aviation sector in the ETS; ultimately, only 
intra-European Economic Area flights would be included.8485 At the end of 2023, this 
restriction may be re-evaluated to again attempt inclusion of international flights within the 
trading scheme;86 it remains to be seen whether a second piece of legislation will be more 
successful at coercing international cooperation than the last.    
 Further adjustments to the ETS were established as part of Phase II. In addition to the 
expansion to the aviation sector, a number of other sectors were also included for evaluation 
(though not allowances/caps), in order to include them in the third phase of ETS trading. In 
principle, these measures were intended to bring the EU ETS to full coverage across all 
sectors – and, by extension, to include all greenhouse gas emissions from the Member States 
and other participating countries – within the mechanisms of the emissions market and 
trading scheme.87 While the National Allocation Plans were retained, the failures of Phase 
I’s allocation system prompted the ETS authorities to shift a portion of allocations to auction, 
rather than free allocation. This change would not take effect, however, until the completion 
of Phase II.88         
 Unfortunately, Phase II experienced many of the same issues of pricing during the 
observation period. Throughout the second phase, prices for emissions remained more stable 
than they had during the first phase, but there was a general long-term fall that became even 
steeper after the failure of a 2009 climate conference in Copenhagen to prescribe legally 
 
83 “Trouble in the Air, Double on the Ground.” The Economist, 11 Feb. 2012, 
www.economist.com/node/21547283. Accessed 20 July 2019. 
84 European Commission. “Reducing Emissions from Aviation.” Climate Action, 23 Nov. 2016, 
ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation_en. Accessed 15 July 2019. 
85 United States Congress. An Act to Prohibit Operators of Civil Aircraft of the United States from 
Participating in  the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme, and for Other Purposes. 27 Dec. 2012, 
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-112publ200/pdf/PLAW-112publ200.pdf. 
86 German Emissions Trading Authority. “DEHSt  -  Expansion of Emissions Trading to Other Sectors.” 
Dehst.De, 2018, www.dehst.de/EN/understanding-emissions-
trading/developments/other_sectors/other_sectors_node.html. Accessed 21 July 2019. 
87 European Union. “National Allocation Plans.” European Commission, 23 Nov. 2016, 
ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/pre2013/nap_en. Accessed 1 Aug. 2019. 
88 European Commission. “European Commission - PRESS RELEASES  - Press Release - Questions and 
Answers on the Revised EU Trading System.” Europa.Eu, 2012, 
europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/796. Accessed 17 July 2019. 
| McLaughlin 27 
 
binding emissions reduction goals (China vetoed the core elements of the agreement).89 By 
2010, the allowance prices had reached €12.40 per ton. The slide continued through 2012 
and the end of the second phase, ending at €6.67 per ton.90 It thus became clear that significant 
revisions to the EU ETS’ structure would be necessary if the system was to fulfill the 
objectives of the Commission and the Member States, to say nothing of the ambitions for 
global emissions reduction at the United Nations level.     
 Phase III began with several major changes, most importantly the abolition of the 
National Allocation Plan system that had essentially placed the Member States between 
European emitters and the European Commission as middlemen responsible for distribution 
of allocation certificates.91 Instead of the individual Member State caps, from 2013, the 
Commission would set an EU ETS-wide cap, to which all Member States and participating 
associate states would need to collectively adhere.92 Additionally, the Phase III revisions 
imposed restrictions on banking allowances, a phenomenon that had augmented the problem 
of windfall profits and been central to the endless price falling. Finally, and importantly, the 
Phase III changes included a wholesale shift from allowances to auctioning93. Beginning in 
the 2013 cycle, the emitters of the ETS’ thirty-one countries (after Croatia’s accession) would 
acquire their allocations via competitive auction, except for a portion reserved as part of the 
newly-established “New Entrants Reserve”, or NER, a framework designed to further 
incentivize “low-carbon” innovation, such as Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and general 
abatement measures applicable to energy producers and industry.94 Phase III would last 
through the end of 2020.95         
 Prices during Phase III hit an immediate setback with the further collapse of the 
emissions price to just under 3 euros per ton emitted in January 2013. The large number of 
banked emissions allocations brought over from Phase II further prolonged this price 
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depression.96 However, over time, the price again began to rise, a trend which – besides a 
few small dips during 2016 and 2017, has continued mostly uninterrupted through 2019. As 
of July 2019, the price for emissions allocations under the EU ETS was €27.95 per ton97, a 
strong figure that both incentivizes abatement and serves as an attractive number for 
emissions market participation for investors. Phase III, therefore, has been by far the most 
effective of the EU emissions trading system’s phases. Its success has made a strong case for 
the role of auctioning in allocating emissions certificates, as well as the collectivization of 
emissions caps at the EU level.        
 Mechanisms of the EU ETS were devised with the intention of achieving not just 
internal goals of the Commission and the Member States, but also fulfilling certain specific 
ambitions of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and its 1992 predecessor, the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change.98 In the Kyoto document, several “flexible 
mechanisms” were proposed and their institutional frameworks developed: 
● The Clean Development Mechanism, and associated Certified Emission 
Reductions, or CERs. The Clean Development Mechanism is primarily 
designed as a framework for both developed and developing countries to 
begin a process of emissions reduction via market-based trading schemes. 
● Joint Implementation projects, and associated Emission Reduction Units, or 
ERUs. Joint Implementation projects are a framework by which developed 
countries can assist (via direct investment) in a emissions reduction project in 
another developed country, receiving emissions reduction credits (ERUs) that 
count towards binding domestic emissions reduction targets. 
● International Emissions Trading. Of the three Kyoto Protocol flexibility 
mechanism frameworks, IET is naturally the most immediately applicable to 
the EU ETS. Under treaty specifications, however, International Emissions 
Trading can include national policy that takes advantage of the other two 
flexibility mechanisms as well. Importantly, the International Emissions 
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Trading mechanism also includes the ability for national governments to 
acquire Certified Emission Reduction certificates by investing in emissions 
reduction in developing states.99100 
The EU ETS collectivizes the European Union Member States’ participation in 
international emissions reduction systems like those established in the Kyoto Protocol. 
National emissions caps, still established individually, are confirmed by the European 
Commission and monitored by both national and EU-level observation.101 The allocation 
approved for individual Member States can then be distributed to private or public sector 
emitters per domestically-established policy methods. Being a market-based emissions 
trading scheme, the ETS allows emitters to trade their allocations, either on an open market, 
via a direct seller-to-buyer transaction or via a third-party broker. Because the mechanisms 
of the Kyoto Protocol frameworks are integrated into the European market system, emitters 
(public or private) who are able to qualify for either Certified Emissions Reduction 
certificates or Emissions Reduction Unit credits can use these mechanisms to fulfill their 
obligations and meet the allocation restrictions established under national allocation 
requirements.102 Under the modern (Phase II and later) ETS, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change acts as a third layer of authorization (after the national and 
EU) layers for ensuring fair accounting of both net emissions and emissions allocation 
crediting.103           
 A notable element of the early EU ETS was its reliance on the Member States to set 
allocation policy relatively autonomously. Although the Commission ultimately approved 
the national allocation schemes, this flexibility permitted a great deal of national – and even 
regional – policy approaches to emissions reduction for compliance with allocation 
restrictions. This ability to individually develop policy was also beneficial to the European 
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Union as a political union; rather than the allocation schemes being dictated unilaterally from 
above, Member States were encouraged to collaborate both with each other and with the 
Commission itself in order to ensure sustainable and politically viable emission reduction 
policy. The loose approach to allocation, however, resulted in the less-than-impressive 
results of Phase I, and, to some degree, Phase II as well. With Phase III changing the national 
caps to an EU-wide cap, this element of autonomy has been diminished somewhat, but there 
remains strong influence of the European Council (and by extension, Member State 
governments) in confirming important structural changes to the emissions trading system’s 
mechanisms, such as the minimum reserve price legislation added into Phase III/IV. 
Additionally, the Commission still relies on participating national governments to ensure 
cooperation from domestic emitters, making the Member States still vital to the Monitoring, 
Reporting, and Verification (MRV) process.104 This mutual reliance builds institutional trust 
and strength over time, and retains for the Member States the necessary political room to set 
climate policy as best suits their needs.       
 On the other hand, however, there are certain disadvantages to this approach. For one, 
without a top-down suite of specific sector emission reduction priorities, it becomes difficult 
to incentivize specific market-wide sector-based reduction goals. So long as participating 
Member States meet their agreed-upon targets, this is not a problem, and net emissions will 
decrease naturally over time under the pressure of the market mechanism. If the targets are 
not met, however, and the authority of the market mechanism and its enforcement bodies are 
undermined, the lack of an express avenue for policy direction could mean a cascading 
degradation of the emissions market mechanism itself. So far, this scenario has not come to 
pass, but the intransigence of politicians in certain participating Member States – notably 
Poland105 – in earnestly working to fulfil their previously-agreed emissions reduction targets 
could engender such a crisis scenario in the future, should the carefully-managed balance 
between the Member States and the Commission break down unexpectedly.  
           
IV. EU ETS – Performance and Outlook 
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Europe’s Emissions Trading System is the largest active emissions market in the 
world, the main conduit for industry emissions in nearly three dozen countries, and the 
likeliest foundation for a hypothetical global emissions market that could well one day 
encompass the bulk of human greenhouse gas production. In many respects, it has enjoyed 
unprecedented success; the EU has met its emissions reduction goals set so far, and is on 
track to meet its goals for emission reduction in 2020, 2030, and 2050.106 Today, the EU ETS 
accounts for more than three quarters of all international carbon trading.107   
 A comprehensive literature review on the subject of EU ETS effectiveness was 
published by Freiburg’s Öko-Institut in 2015. “Effectiveness”, the Öko-Institut paper 
specifies, “refers to the extent to which the intervention caused the observed effects and 
whether or not these effects correspond to the objectives of the intervention”. The 2015 
document, which evaluates performance in relation to the goals of the then-recently-
established 2030 Framework of the European Council (approved in 2014), qualifies its 
analysis along three categories: long-term impacts, short-term results, and outputs. “Long-” 
and “short-” term, in this context, refer to both intentional and unplanned outcomes, 
accounted for by the systems of the ETS mechanism or not.    
 In December 2018, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) published a paper titled “The Joint Impact of the European Union Emissions Trading 
System on Carbon Emissions and Economic Performance”, in which it evaluated the effects 
of the EU ETS as they relate to the specifics of the policy suite.108 The OECD paper found 
a “causal impact” of the EU ETS on emissions reduction, one of statistically significant 
stature. “Most of the reduction”, the OECD paper confirms, was achieved since Phase II of 
the ETS began in 2008. Notably, the authors say: 
“We also find that allocating free emissions allowances significantly reduces the 
treatment effect. Our results suggest emissions would have declined by around 25% 
if only half the allowances would have been freely distributed.”109    
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The outlook for the EU ETS is undoubtedly positive. The goals of simultaneous 
steady emissions reduction and market stability have now been achieved, and the emissions 
market is a successful model for others elsewhere. Phase IV has not yet begun, and will 
officially do so in 2021, after Phase III’s conclusion. It will run through the end of 2028, 
though the European Commission intends to conduct a mid-term evaluation by 2026.110 The 
structural changes that led to the satisfactory performance of the third phase will be retained, 
but a number of additional features will be appended to the ETS, agreed upon in 2014 by the 
European Council.111 First (and most politically controversial), the linear reduction factor (or 
LRF) that forms the core operating formula for the EU-wide emissions cap will be increased 
significantly, from 1.74% per year to 2.2% per year. By 2030, it is hoped, this increased LRF 
will have cut EU greenhouse gas emissions by 43% relative to 2005.112   
 In addition, the Council determined that 12% of verified annual emissions during 
Phase IV would be placed into an “automatic set-aside reserve mechanism”, essentially 
creating a carbon floor price.113 It is hoped that by creating such a floor price – which, if 
reached by the market, would effectively function as a carbon tax within the emissions 
trading system – the market failures of the first two phases that resulted in such low prices 
can be avoided, and the incentives of the emissions trading scheme upheld.114 Finally, the 
Commission made a further recommendation that the EU ETS be “link[ed] up with 
compatible systems around the world to form the backbone of a global carbon market”115, 
should the international political opportunity for such a market arise. Although most of these 
reforms would not take effect until the formal beginning of Phase IV, the carbon price floor 
mechanism was deemed important enough to push back into the later years of Phase III. 
Consequently, the price floor mechanism will tentatively be deployed at the end of 2019.116   
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 There are areas where the European Union’s campaign to reduce emissions may be 
further expanded, both as extensions to the EU ETS and as supplementary or complementary 
policy initiatives. One such proposal that has been discussed at the Commission level is the 
hypothetical implementation of a carbon border tax or tariff. Such a tariff would be designed 
to apply costs to goods produced abroad in the absence of a carbon tax or emissions trading 
system (and have therefore not been “charged” the costs of the emissions created in their 
production). Policy of this kind would achieve two main purposes. First, it would directly cut 
off the ability of European or overseas emitters to avoid the costs of emissions that might be 
applied within the EU ETS by relying on production abroad, where such costs are not applied. 
Secondly, a carbon border tariff would level the market for emitters that do participate 
wholesale in the EU ETS without offshoring production, and prevent price undercutting at 
those firms’ expense.117 Another, less direct consequence that could prove nevertheless 
useful to the European Union in a political sense would be the application of significant 
pressure on countries like the United States and Brazil, who choose not to uphold 
international climate change and emissions abatement agreements. 
 
V. The Chinese ETS 
Any analysis of China’s energy and climate policy should be prefaced by some 
important points. Most importantly, China has been since 2006 the world’s most prolific 
polluter, emitting 9.84 billion tons of greenhouse gases in 2017 alone.118 It is unlikely that 
any other country will challenge China for this unfortunate distinction until at least 2030, 
after which time China has pledged to reduce its emissions under the terms of the Paris 
Agreement. In the meantime, its reductions will be tied to domestic endeavors centered on 
Beijing’s efforts to increase carbon efficiency, and policy intended to make use of the 
Chinese mixed economy.         
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Road Initiative” bid to extend economic and political influence globally, and across Africa 
and Asia in particular, China and Chinese-sponsored multinational corporations have 
invested billions of dollars in overseas industrial development projects. 70 countries have 
signed onto the initiative, accepting Chinese financing for infrastructure development of all 
kinds, including power plants, since the program’s launch in 2013.119 No restrictions are 
placed on these projects concerning emissions regulation, efficiency ratings, or local area 
impact by the investors. Much like China, which was able to swiftly industrialize huge 
portions of its economy, but at the cost of a doubling in greenhouse gas emissions, 
governments of participating countries are often willing to stomach such consequences in 
order to pursue more developed economies. According to economist Nicholas Stern, these 
Belt and Road Initiative member countries – whose collective average GDP per capita is less 
than half that of China’s – would tip the goals of the Paris Agreement into impossibility 
should they develop at the pace China did during the period from 2000-2010.120 
Consequently, the emissions footprint of the People’s Republic tallies to a figure far beyond 
its already-significant domestic production.        
 Even if China and its Belt and Road Initiative partner countries are able to achieve 
their desired industrialization goals without the anticipated colossal consequences to global 
emissions, the process by which China extends its global infrastructure network to include 
them will itself be the source of a massive increase to emissions. As of 2019, 240 “coal 
projects” across 25 countries are being constructed by Chinese companies; the vast majority 
of these endeavors involve no carbon capture technology whatsoever.121 Combined with the 
necessity of constructing vast new webs of transportation infrastructure in every one of the 
Belt and Road initiative countries, China is in a sense exporting carbon emissions overseas 
for its own commercial, political, and geostrategic interests.     
 Additionally, Chinese political priorities, as first expressed by Hu Jintao and the 
ruling Communist Party, are focused on facilitating what the CPC terms China’s “peaceful 
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rise”122 into global prominence, powered by the world’s largest industrial economy. This goal 
is not necessarily incompatible with the shared global goal of emissions reduction, but it does 
place green energy politics in a precarious political position. With the goal of Chinese mass 
industrialization (and eventually, Beijing hopes, incontrovertible Great Power status) coming 
first, only policies that do not prove impediments to the long-term strategies that lead there 
are permissible. This unspoken restriction applies across all disciplines and affects all 
policymaking. In emissions trading, however, the constraints become particularly clear. The 
slow-motion rollout and repeated delays of China’s carbon market infrastructure demonstrate 
this amply, as does China’s refusal to commit to net emissions reductions in the Paris Climate 
Agreement.123 Instead of flat emissions reductions, China has opted to commit to reductions 
in emissions intensity, a far more nebulous and hard-to-verify measurement that records “the 
level of greenhouse gas emissions per unit of economic activity”.124 Conveniently for China, 
this means that the country can make such a far-off commitment to begin reducing emissions 
only after 2030, and that the already-beginning slowdown of growth in the Chinese 
economy125 will make emissions intensity thresholds more attainable, where net reduction 
goals might be more difficult or costly.       
 The above criticisms aside, China’s goals for its emissions trading system are in line 
with its commitment under the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change. It intends to reduce 
carbon intensity by 40 to 45 percent (relative to 2005 levels) by 2020, and to achieve peak 
emissions by 2030. It covers eight sectors of the Chinese economy, mostly related to 
industrial emissions126: 
● Aviation – unlike the European ETS, China’s in-progress National ETS will 
include aviation emissions from the beginning. Given China’s prior hostility 
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to including aviation emissions in the European emissions market, it remains 
unclear how China’s policy shift in this area will affect the aviation industry 
globally and China’s interaction with the EU ETS. 
● Building materials
● Chemicals





VI. China’s ETS – Performance and Outlook
It remains challenging, at the current juncture, to fairly evaluate the performance of 
China’s energy market scheme. For one, the scheme has not yet been fully implemented, and 
making judgements about its sum effects would be entirely premature. The characteristics, 
configurations, and results of the small-scale pilot emissions markets that have been 
implemented are well documented, however. Consequently, this section will focus on 
evaluation of the collection of experimental emissions trading systems that the Communist 
Party has collectively dubbed the Low Carbon Development Pilot Program.127 Though 
Western documentation on these smaller schemes is limited, there are a few well-researched 
papers from both Chinese government-aligned and independent Chinese scholars, many of 
the latter in collaboration with American universities. 
We can evaluate the Chinese approach to emissions trading policy based on its rollout 
in prefecture-level cities throughout the country, and the performance of its experimental 
emissions trading scheme in the variety of configurations these provincial implementations 
have been arrayed. Approval of the experimental system in 2011 by the Chinese 
government’s National Development and Reform Commission, or NDRC, took place in 
order to prepare Chinese national institutions for emissions trading, since no similar endeavor 
had been undertaken in the country before.128 China has established eight emissions markets 
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in seven cities, each with different trading periods, different industrial sector coverage, and 
different mechanisms for allowance distribution. Additionally, each of the so-called “pilot 
programs” was permitted to configure the fundamental design mechanisms for its specific 
emissions market scheme; according to Prof. ZhongXiang Zhang of Fudan University’s 
School of Economics, this relative institutional freedom led to different approaches to 
transactions, price uncertainty, and managing risk.129     
 The cities that participated in the pilot emissions trading schemes were selected in 
order to reflect the diversity of economic, political, social, and industrial character of a vast 
and populous country like China.130 In chronological order of start date, they are: 
● Shenzhen, whose pilot market was launched in June 2013. Shenzhen was 
selected both for its large urban population – more than twelve million people, 
roughly that of Belgium – and unique characteristics of its political 
configuration. Directly adjacent to the autonomous regions of Hong Kong and 
Macau, Shenzhen is a designated “Special Economic Zone”, permitted more 
than other areas of the country to engage in free market and investment-driven 
economics at the policy level. Specifically, in Special Economic Zones, the 
Chinese central government is not required to approve business activities of 
either a domestic or international nature, nor to organize the economic 
systems around which those transactions take place.131 Shenzhen was chosen 
for an emissions trading pilot in order to test the effectiveness in order to test 
such a system in the People Republic’s closest extant equivalent to a free 
market system (Hong Kong and Macau excluded). 
● Shanghai, whose pilot market was launched in November 2013. Shanghai, the 
financial center of China, is the most populous urban area in the country, with 
more than twenty-six million people. The city hosts the busiest port in the 
world and as well as the Shanghai Futures Exchange, which  competes with 
Hong Kong and Singapore for preeminence in East Asian finance. Shanghai 
was selected for an emissions trading pilot in order to observe the interaction 
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of emissions trading with strong local financial markets already in place. 
Shanghai is one of four cities (“Municipalities”, in official language) in China 
directly under the control of the central government, and as such effectively 
exists as a province-level entity. All four participated in the experimental pilot 
market schemes. 
● Beijing, whose pilot market was launched in November 2013. Like Shanghai, 
Beijing is a Municipality, and blurs the line between province and city. As the 
capital of China, it is a hub for political activity and an administrative center. 
Beijing therefore needed no particular justification for selection as a pilot for 
an emissions trading system. 
● Guangdong province, whose pilot market was launched in December 2013. 
Guangdong is a province, not a city, and in fact includes the city of Shenzhen, 
which (as earlier noted) also began an emissions market pilot program of its 
own. Because Shenzhen exists in its own Special Economic Zone, 
Guangdong’s pilot market exists separately from that of Shenzhen. The 
province is one of the most populous subnational divisions in the world, with 
more than 113 million people, making it larger by several million people than 
any single European country, even without Shenzhen.132 Guangdong is 
notable in China, and in general, for being a major manufacturing center. The 
province was chosen for a pilot emissions trading program in order to test 
performance in a region reliant on heavy manufacturing activity for its local 
economic health. 
● Tianjin, whose pilot market was also launched in December 2013. A 
Municipality beholden directly to the central government, Tianjin is a 
significant center of industry, and a major port city. It, like Chongqing, was 
chosen for a pilot emissions trading program in order to test interactions 
between emissions trading systems and the functions of a heavily industrial 
local economy that produces a great deal of emissions. 
● Hubei province, whose pilot market was launched in April 2014. Being a 
province, like Guangdong, rather than a single city, Hubei contains a number 
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of smaller political entities of both urban and rural nature. Its population is 
roughly equal to that of Italy (60 million people). Wuhan, the capital city of 
Hubei, is a noteworthy center of iron and steel production, and a 
disproportionately large emitter of greenhouse gases [cite this if possible] 
● Chongqing, whose pilot market was launched in June 2014. Much like
Tianjin, Chongqing is both a Municipality of China and a major industrial
center, though it is notable in and of itself as a nearly province-sized entity,
both in terms of land area (roughly the size of Austria) and population. Nearly
30 million people live in Chongqing, making it the most populous city in
China’s western interior. Chongqing was selected for a pilot emissions trading
program much for the same reasons as Tianjin, though the additional
consideration of its uniquely prominent stature in China’s interior surely
played a role in its selection as well.
Though it was not one of the original seven cities or provinces selected for an 
experimental emissions trading system, China permitted an additional test market to be 
launched: 
● Fujian province, whose pilot market was launched in September 2016. Unlike
the other pilot locations, Fujian is not known for any particular political,
administrative, or economic distinction, but is instead a rather diverse
province including urban areas (some, like Quanzhou and Fuzhou, of
significant size), semi-urban industrial areas, and rural areas.133
Zhang’s paper (which was published in 2015, thus preceding the Fujian pilot’s 
approval and launch) notes that the various pilot zones were chosen specifically in order to 
take advantage of disparate regional and urban characteristics that might prove conducive to 
the efficacy of emissions market performance. With each of the eight political entities above 
permitted to organize its emissions trading system on particular, regionally-appropriate lines, 
it was hoped that certain observable trends might become apparent across these vastly 
dissimilar markets – trends that could, with careful policy application, ultimately serve to 
133 International Carbon Action Partnership. Emissions Trading Worldwide International Carbon Action 
Partnership (ICAP) Status Report 2017. 2017. 
McLaughlin | 40 
strengthen a national-level emissions trading system.134 
These regional and metropolitan emissions markets ultimately diverged significantly 
in policy implementation without prodding from the central government. China’s (self-
described) status as a market economy that is not yet fully “mature”, as it remains in the 
process of shifting away from central planning, played a role in these institutional design 
considerations (excepting, to some degree, Shenzhen). In recognition of this designation, the 
Chinese pilot emissions markets implemented their schemes without explicit modelling upon 
any foreign system, European or otherwise. Zhang notes that China’s government 
acknowledged in the post-2010 years of energy policy re-evaluation that central planning 
“administrative measures” as the primary means of emissions reduction are “effective, but 
not efficient”. Assessment of market forces’ ability to create positive outcomes in this regard, 
therefore, was deemed a priority, and noted in especial focus in the Third Plenum of the 18th 
Central Committee to “assign the market a decisive role in allocating resources”.135 While 
this decree is ultimately relevant to entire swathes of the Chinese economic system, it is 
notable in particular for emissions trading because it illustrates the gradual shift in approach 
undertaken by the Chinese government in its approach to managing problems involving 
externalities – like that of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Preeminent among the government’s concerns was ensuring appropriate pricing.136 
Unlike the European Union, whose members operate as autonomous economies somewhat 
collectivized by monetary union and initiatives undertaken by the European Commission and 
Parliament, China is a single economy, with a single fiscal policy, alone in gross domestic 
product nearly matching that of the European Union. For this reason, a potential failure in 
developing emissions pricing could have a much more damaging blowback effect on China’s 
emissions market system than it would on the EU ETS, contained as such economic effects 
could be to single countries in the latter. The failure of EU ETS’ Phase I serves as an example 
of such a policy failure that the Communist Party sought to avoid, and for which the pilot 
emissions market program was designed to preempt and avoid via experimental policy 
measures. 
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The seven original pilot schemes shared a few guiding conditions. For one, all seven 
had the same initial market period, from 2013 to 2015. Also notable was the condition of the 
emissions coverage mechanism; in order to prioritize development, deployment, and 
evaluation of policy on a specific target, only carbon dioxide would be monitored and traded 
by the regional and metropolitan pilot schemes.137 Another distinction shared by all the 
Chinese pilot market schemes is the method by which emissions are accounted for. In the 
European ETS structure, and in most other emissions trading monitoring systems worldwide, 
the tracking of emissions occurs directly at “targeted installations”, generally facilities such 
as factories, mines, or power plants where the bulk of greenhouse gas emissions take place. 
China’s systems, however, make these recordings in a different fashion: all trackable 
emissions, regardless of specific source, are covered by the Chinese pilot systems.138 
Additionally, the pilot mechanisms include generated emissions that are considered 
“indirect”, generally those that contribute to the economy of a region, but are actually emitted 
elsewhere.139 The European Union’s ETS does not do this. The reasoning for China’s pilot 
systems to track indirect emissions is twofold. For one, the interconnectedness of the Chinese 
economy across administrative metropolitan or provincial boundaries makes it necessary to 
include indirect emissions or risk entire swathes of a regional economy falling outside the 
scope of the emissions market entirely. Zhang gives the example of Beijing, which imports 
60% or more of its power generation from other regions of the country, which would lie 
outside Beijing’s emissions trading market scheme if left distinct.140 Secondly, the inclusion 
of indirect emissions is intended to reduce so-called “carbon leakage” within the country, 
wherein covered entities might attempt to shift emissions outside the zone of the market 
mechanism (in this case, elsewhere within China) in order to avoid the costs associated with 
the market mechanism without the intervention of the overseeing entity.141 This behavior can 
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also manifest in terms of sector shift; for example, should an emitter find that one type of 
greenhouse gas emissions are monitored or priced to a degree lower than that which the 
emitter currently produces, that emitter might find it profitable to shift from one form of 
greenhouse gas emissions to another, without reducing its net output. By covering both direct 
and indirect emissions, and monitoring all emissions without regard to specific point of 
origin, the Chinese pilot schemes were intended to reduce such leakages and inefficiencies 
in the market mechanisms.        
 All the pilot systems shared a similar approach to allowance holding. The so-called 
practice of “banking” allowances – keeping certificates from one year to the next – was 
permitted, but 2015 was designated a finite cut-off point, by which allowances were required 
to be used or lost. Additionally, the government prohibited borrowing funds in order to 
purchase allowances on the market mechanism. Finally, every pilot emissions market system 
was required to make use of the same standardized monitoring units: Chinese Certified 
Emission Reductions, or CCERs. These units, which were designed in order to maximize 
efficiency of central government policy comparison and evaluation, include provisions for 
specificity of emissions recording applicable to any sector or industry.142 The Chinese 
Certified Emissions Reductions units are a framework built upon the Flexible Mechanisms 
of the Kyoto Protocol, mentioned previously in section IV of this paper. Specifically, the 
CCERS make use of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), under which industrialized 
(Annex I and II category) countries can purchase certificates to invest funds abroad – in 
industrializing or developing (Annex B or Least-Developed) countries – specifically in clean 
development. China is a major recipient of these investments143, as an Annex B country, 
making harmonization of the CDM system with local emissions trading schemes an 
important element of the policy framework for their institutional design. In fact, China 
represents the largest source of Clean Development Mechanism credits of any signatory to 
the United Nations Framework on Climate Change, more than the rest of the world combined.
 Besides these common features outlined above, China’s province- and city-specific 
pilot emissions trading programs developed vastly divergent approaches to policy. In their 
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2018 paper “China’s Carbon Market: Accelerating a Green Economy in China and Reducing 
Global Emissions”, Professors Yifei Zhang, Jonathan Harris, and Jin Li of Tufts University 
and the Shanghai Environment and Energy Exchange argue that the seven pilot systems’ 
institutional designs represent seven ways of approaching and implementing the so-called 
“Two Mountain Theory”, as proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2016.144 The Two Mountain 
Theory, in principle, is the idea that economic means should supplement ecological means – 
and vice versa – in combating and preventing damage to the Chinese environment145. This 
acknowledgement of the role of development was repeated in the official record of the 19th 
National Congress of the Communist Party, in which officials at all levels of government 
were encouraged to prioritize “development, poverty alleviation, and environmental 
protection” together, rather than as separate endeavors.146     
 The process of allocating quotas was one such ETS function that both varied amongst 
the pilot market participants and served to apply the multiple focuses (development and 
ecological interest) of Xi and the Communist Party. All of the eight pilot emissions trading 
schemes used some degree of free allocation, and in most free allocation remained the sole 
form of allocation.147 In these, combinations of grandfathering-based allocation and 
benchmarking were generally used, though with different setups for each. Chongqing, for 
example, established its free allocation entirely via grandfathering, with allocation tied to the 
highest recorded emissions over the four years prior to the rollout of the pilot scheme. Zhang 
writes that this was to “reduce the effect of ‘whipping the fast ox’ to the extent possible” – 
i.e., to avoid disproportionately applying cost to emitters that had already begun to make 
themselves more efficient. Shanghai extended this consideration even further, allowing 
emitters to earn rewards “for having taken actions for energy-saving technical transformation 
or energy performance over the period 2006-11”, and setting these rewards at a full 30% of 
the total revenue from the pilot emissions market scheme.148    
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 Though all of the pilot systems make use of free allocation, Guangdong and Shenzhen 
developed unique ways of distributing said allocation. In Shenzhen, the pilot authority 
created a “competitive game-based allocation of allowances in one given sector.” From 
Zhang:  
“The key game rules are defined as follows. First, the emissions cap of a given sector 
is set. Second, all regulated entities in one given sector are informed about historical 
and target intensity benchmarks of that sector. Third, each regulated entity submits 
its emissions allowance demand and projected output to compete with other entities 
in the same sector for free allowances. Fourth, historically more carbon-intensive 
entities are required to achieve more reductions and at the same time, entities whose 
existing carbon intensities are low are encouraged for [sic] large reduction. In each 
round of the game, one entity can choose to accept allowances and exit the game 
provided that it is satisfied with its allocation. If not, it can choose to continue to 
compete for allowances in the next round of game. As the sector cap is set, allowances 
allocated to those satisfied entities in this round of game [are] deducted and thus 
allowances available for the remaining rounds will decrease as the game repeats.”149 
Guangdong did not attempt such an audaciously experimental method, but it did run an 
equally novel allocation system. In Guangdong’s pilot system, emitters were granted ninety-
seven percent of emissions allocation for free according to standard methods, but were 
required to purchase 3% via auction. This would be a fairly standard arrangement, if not for 
the additional requirement that the emitters must purchase the 3% of auctioned certificates 
before being granted their free allocations. The 3% figure was then increased to 10% in 2015. 
“The Guangdong pilot”, Zhang says, “would make these enterprises directly feel the cost of 
emissions” first, partially in order to double check that the state’s understanding of emissions 
demand was accurate, and partially in order to directly levy cost unto the emitter as is typical 
in the auction scheme.150 By placing the auction first in the process, before allocation took 
place, Guangdong forced its emitters to choose between cost of guaranteed (auctioned) 
certificates, or risk suboptimal free allocations if the auction was ignored.   
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evaluation of benchmarks derived from industrial record-keeping. Shanghai did much the 
same as these two cities, but replaced the consideration regarding carbon intensity with a 
“early abatement incentive”, as well as the extendable baseline year mentioned earlier. The 
two provinces, Guangdong and Hubei, configured their pilot systems much the same fashion, 
minus the early abatement incentive. Shenzhen used the aforementioned competitive game 
to allocate its initial allocation packages, then industrial benchmarking for the remainder. 
Chongqing, finally, elected not to involve the allocation authority at all in the process of 
distribution, instead providing allocations completely according to the requested number of 
certificates requested by the covered emitters.151      
 Policy varied further across the seven (later eight) pilots. Coverage, for example, was 
established via tonnage, and each pilot emissions market system maintained its own threshold 
for inclusion. In Shanghai, which had the lowest such threshold, fifty-seven percent of 
emissions in the administrative region were included. (For comparison, the EU Emissions 
Trading System covers roughly forty-nine percent of participating state emissions.) But on 
the low end, Hubei’s pilot system only covered thirty-six percent of emissions.152 To a certain 
extent, this is an expected outcome; Shanghai is a highly urban, highly developed, mostly 
post-industrial city-region, while Hubei is a center of industry that is heavily industrialized. 
This disparity, however, highlights the difficulty of implementing emissions markets across 
divergent local economies such as between Shanghai and Hubei province, and minimizing 
the kinds of inefficiencies that could cause under-coverage in a region like Hubei or over-
inclusion prompted by cities like Shanghai, that causes unintended economic disruption to 
more industrial and rural areas. Observing such outcomes, divergent as they were, were 
precisely why the government of China insisted on establishing the pilot schemes before 
developing a nationwide scheme.      
 Additional considerations in the pilot schemes were given to other elements of the 
market system, including those outside the direct control of the systems’ institutional designs 
and their monitoring authorities. For example, in regions or cities where a single steel 
company is dominant, authorities wished to avoid market dominance of a single player, 
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which could then influence prices disproportionately, or even exert influence over the 
allocation process. To counter this potential outcome, many of the pilot schemes established 
maximum quotas or bid percentages. In Beijing, auctions restricted emitters to purchasing no 
more than fifteen percent of the total allowances for sale. Others approached the issue from 
a more granular angle; in Shanghai, firm-to-firm transactions above one hundred thousand 
tons’ worth of allowances must be accomplished via negotiations involving the market at 
large.153 In each of the pilot ETS schemes, the allocation authorities also established a system 
of reserve allocations, to supplement the primary allocation mechanisms described above. 
 The success or failure of China’s emissions trading ambitions will undoubtedly 
depend to a great extent on its institutional design choices, both in the rollout period and in 
the long term. But there are further considerations distinct from institutional design that are 
also worth noting, as they are unique to China and contrast with prior attempts by Western 
democratic governments to attempt emissions trading system implementation. Most 
important of these will be the willingness of the ruling Communist Party of China to commit 
to emissions trading – and by extension, to the principles of free markets – as a tool applied 
to the economy at large. While China’s government has made steps since the Deng Xiaoping 
government of the 1980s to shift its command economy towards something more resembling 
market economics (most famously articulated by Deng’s government as “Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics”154) it has resolutely avoided making parallel shifts towards 
democratization. As such, Chinese policy-makers exert a great deal of political power while 
being free, to a certain extent, from popular accountability. In some senses, this presents 
opportunities for China to proactively pursue any of a variety of wide-ranging economic 
policy choices.        
 However, Chinese authoritarianism should not be construed as some kind of 
unambiguously positive advantage to policy development, or to the implementation of carbon 
trading systems in particular, compared to the European Union or other democratic societies. 
While it is true that China has the ability to forcefully implement policy or quickly transition 
between economic incentive schemes more swiftly than would be possible in a democratic 
country, it faces some significant shortcomings when it comes to policy development. 
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Democracies, and the people who lead them, are fundamentally accountable to both voters 
and to private interests in ways that strongly incentivize not just political viability, but policy 
effectiveness. In China, leadership is not accountable to the citizenry, and while private 
interests do play a significant and sometimes powerful role in the Chinese system, the line 
between private interests and the state itself is frequently blurred. To be clear: built-in 
democratic features of accountable government do not necessarily ensure good policy, 
especially given that populist political choices can result in clashing priorities of government. 
Where emissions trading is concerned, this collision of government priorities becomes 
especially relevant. But there is a fundamental advantage held by systems that receive 
constant pressure from affected parties on all levels of the political sphere in the form of 
lobbying, public policy debate, and verifiable economic status updates. In China, the 
government must shape its policy priorities in response to internal Communist Party concerns 
and priorities, but is notably removed from the kinds of decision-making incentives that 
strengthen policy in democracies.        
 In 2017, researchers from Wuhan University, Tsinghua University Shenzhen, and the 
University of California at Berkeley published “The Allowance Mechanism of China’s 
Carbon Trading Pilots: A Comparative Analysis with Schemes in the EU and California”, in 
which they made a number of recommendations for “courses of action to strengthen China’s 
existing [emissions trading] pilots and to build valuable experiences for the national cap-and-
trade system in China”.155 Primarily, they argue that the pilot emissions trading schemes 
over-allocated emissions certificates, much like the European Union’s ETS did during its 
Phase I. According to the researchers, China’s “significant economic slowdown” since 2013 
meant that the figures upon which allocations were grandfathered or distributed were based 
on data that was no longer aligned with GDP growth. Over time, the sectors included in the 
emissions market pilots saw “a clear downward trend of [their] production value growth 
rates” – not as a consequence of participation in the carbon market, but as a result of shifts 
in the Chinese economy as a whole. The Hubei pilot market system, it is noted, took care to 
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make use of a “dynamic adjustment measure” that could respond to over-allocation of 
emissions certificates. In the words of the Berkeley paper researchers: 
“This measure allows the program administrator to take back the enterprise’s 
allowances surplus resulting from a sharp drop in production, and cancel the 
allowances in the government reserve and the new entrants reserve which cannot be 
distributed until the compliance date, and further reduce the total allowances of the 
entry year.”156 
This mechanism, it would seem, gives the allocation authority tools to respond to the effects 
of over-allocation caused by drawing-down of production in Chinese industries, whether the 
result of slowed GDP growth or other factors.     
 The researchers also note the persistence of the problem effect mentioned earlier: that 
of “whipping the fast ox”.157 Because all of the pilot systems used grandfathering of free 
allocations to some degree, the effect of inadvertent penalization was in turn apparent across 
all the pilot systems, even in Chongqing, where specific measures had been taken to prevent 
such an outcome. Unfortunately, it seems difficult to prevent this effect when making use of 
grandfathered allocation; should free allocation take place, and emitters have taken prior 
steps towards abatement, some level of inadvertent penalization seems to be inherent to the 
process. Fortunately, this effect only takes place a single time (when the emissions market 
system is first established), but given the penalization effects that directly contradict the 
intended incentives of the emissions market, it is a problem worth addressing. The Berkeley 
paper’s research group makes the recommendation that Chinese emissions trading schemes 
should set up award systems like those in place in the Chongqing pilot system in order to 
minimize the “whipping the fast ox” problem, or, instead, to use what they call an 
“adjustment factor”, a “decreasing function of the covered entity’s recent emission growth.” 
158Most importantly, though, the scholars recommend that China abandon grandfathering 
emissions certificate allocations throughout its emissions market systems and convert all 
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such allocation to a benchmarking approach “that more accurately reflects the actual intensity 
and to award credits for businesses that have taken actions.”159    
 Allocation, however, was not the only major issue to surface during the Chinese pilot 
emissions trading schemes’ operative periods. Another highlighted by the researchers in the 
Berkeley paper was the problem of duplicate record-keeping, or “double-counting” 
emissions. Since the pilot market systems ambitiously sought to include the entirety of 
emissions for their covered sectors, a great deal of double-counting took place. In the 
electricity sector, for example, both producer installations and their customers were made to 
purchase certificates for emissions. The researchers suggest two alternative approaches that 
might prevent this issue. Firstly, the Chinese emissions markets could imitate their 
counterparts in the EU ETS and restrict coverage only to primary emitters (i.e. the power 
generation facilities in the electricity example. Alternatively, the allocation authority can 
devise a system wherein certificates are distributed in such a way as to “divide the 
responsibility between the source of generation and the source of use and allocate allowances 
according to the shared responsibility among the power producers, distribution companies, 
and end consumers. Either solution would be an improvement on the original configurations, 
which resulted in significant inefficiency.       
 Other methods of improvement that might be implemented include restructuring the 
benchmarking process (both to make it more effective and to compensate for the 
inefficiencies of the free allocation process, should it continue to be used), and re-evaluating 
the approach towards allocation in the first place, potentially to include auctioning. Both 
Zhang and the Berkeley researchers advocate for a shift towards a more auctions-focused 
method of emissions certificate distribution. In the words of the latter paper: 
 “…free allocation will lead to reduced efficiency for China’s carbon trade pilots and 
increased abatement cost due to the lack of enterprises’ motivation for innovation. Also, the 
free allocation cannot provide and effective means for the government to obtain necessary 
revenue to support public and community programs in reducing carbon emissions and 
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“Distributing the allowances through competitive auction”, the researchers go on to say, “can 
make enterprises truly realize the ‘emissions cost’, and fully reflect the principle of ‘polluter 
pays’.” This strident endorsement of auctioning as opposed to free allocation seems 
consistent with the findings of most researchers, both in the EU and in China, that 
grandfathered free allocation is a generally suboptimal method of emissions certificate 
allocation, relative to the alternatives mentioned earlier. Finally, the Berkeley paper 
concludes with the frequently-seen recommendation to uphold, enhance, and verify the 
ability of allocation authorities to monitor emitters to ensure accurate and timely data 
collection.           
 What, then, can we expect from China’s nationwide emissions trading system? Some 
known factors:  
• The China national ETS was “politically launched” in December of 2017161, 
though trading has not yet begun. Trading is set to begin in 2020; this date has 
been pushed back twice162. 
• The Chinese government’s emissions trading “Work Plan” is designed in 
phases, much like it European Union counterpart. The first phase is intended 
to last “roughly one year”, and “will focus on the development of market 
infrastructures”, while the second and third phases are intended to gradually 
build the institutions required for simulation trading and spot trading, 
respectively163. 
• China intends its nationwide emissions market to cover roughly thirty percent 
of its national emissions at launch, equal to about three billion tons of carbon 
dioxide equivalent. The government intends to expand this figure over time, 
ahead of the planned emissions peak in 2030.164 
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• As was the case in the pilot schemes, China’s national ETS will only include 
carbon dioxide at launch. Additionally, it will cover both direct and indirect 
emissions, but sets a threshold for inclusion at emitters producing more than 
26,000 tons of emissions per year. Under these rules, about 1,700 entities will 
be subject to the emissions trading system’s allocation structure, though this 
figure may change. 
But there are a number of factors that remain more or less unknown. Most 
importantly, while Chinese emissions market operators have stated that they intend to make 
use of free allocation, the specific variety of free allocation to be used is unclear. ICAP reports 
that the allocation mechanism “is expected to be based on subsector benchmarks with ex-
post adjustments for changes in actual production”165, but there has been no firm guarantee 
of this from the ETS authorities. It seems likely, given the experiences of the pilot emissions 
markets, that the Chinese government will avoid reliance on grandfathering, but it is difficult 
to say for certain ahead of time.        
 China’s Ministry of Ecology and Environment published its “Interim Regulations on 
the Management of Carbon Emissions Trading” in April 2019. The paper discusses several 
aspects of the emissions trading system’s institutional design, with a particular focus on its 
structures for monitoring, reporting, and verification. While the Ministry did not present any 
policy ideas of a particularly groundbreaking nature in this document, its detailed framework 
for enforcement makes it important to our understanding of the future Chinese ETS, once it 
has become active. Penalties have been legally set for emitters that violate the conditions of 
the emissions trading system or inaccurately report their emissions data, including both 
monetary fines and reduced credit scores. Additionally, emitters that fail to purchase enough 
emissions certificates to account for their annual output will be legally required to make up 
the difference in purchased certificates for the next year, even after the aforementioned 
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The European Union and Chinese approaches to emissions trading are clearly distinct. 
Nevertheless, a number of important distinctions exist, particularly in regards to both 
systems’ approach to allocations and sector coverage. These distinctions, and the relative 
degrees of success enjoyed by the EU’s emissions market and the Chinese pilot systems, 
make a compelling argument for certain institutional design choices, and against others. For 
one, grandfathered allocation of free emissions allowances appears to be a less-than-optimal 
mechanism. While there are a good deal of arguments in favor of both allowance auctioning 
and benchmarking of free allocations, both methods – or a combination thereof – appear more 
effective than grandfathered allocation at producing the outcomes intended by the emissions 
market: incentivized emissions abatement, a fair distribution of cost (the “polluter pays” 
principle), and of course a generally well-functioning market system with appropriate pricing 
of emissions. The fact that researchers from China, the European Union, the United States, 
and Australia have all come to similar conclusions demonstrates the consistency of these 
findings.          
 While the European Union appears to have already taken such lessons to policy, and 
shifted towards a significantly higher proportion of auctioned emissions allowances, it could 
still do more to minimize windfall profits and ensure social and economic fairness in its ETS 
system. For one, it may be wise to implement a carbon border tariff, primarily combat the 
negative market effects of an unbalanced international production market across several 
industries and sectors where some countries penalize emissions, while others do not. Even 
without these benefits, the diplomatic pressure thus applied to third parties without emissions 
abatement policies in place would go a long way towards enhancing the overall global goals 
of emissions reduction. Besides a carbon border tariff, the EU ETS could continue its push 
to use data-driven benchmarking for the proportion of allowances that it does not auction, 
and to phase out grandfathering entirely.      
 China’s national emissions market has yet to begin trading, and questions still remain 
about its approach to free allocations, but it appears likely that the Chinese government will 
learn from the experiences of the eight pilot emissions market systems, and deploy some 
variation of the more nuanced approaches to emissions certificate allocation. This is a 
positive sign, as is China’s hardline approach to emissions reporting violations by covered 
emitters. China must maintain such commitments to institutional strength in order to uphold 
a system that, if successful, will surpass the EU ETS to become the largest in the world. 
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Unfortunately, the China National ETS will continue to use grandfathered emissions to 
allocate at least some of its certificates. With time, however, and the collection of larger 
amounts of data, the country might eventually shift towards a benchmarking-based system 
that responds proactively to changes in supply and demand to fairly allocate emissions, a 
change that would increase the efficiency of the allocations, should they still not be purchased 
at auction. 
The nationwide Chinese ETS could do still more, especially in regards to its coverage. 
With China’s emissions trading system only covering about thirty percent of its emissions, 
there still remains a significant amount of abatement that could take place, if more industries 
were included in the new system. This would likely require a number of policy changes, 
including a lowering of the annual emissions threshold for inclusion in the emissions market 
system, as well as an expansion of covered sectors in the Chinese economy. Fundamentally, 
though, the Communist Party’s goal of beginning to decrease China’s emissions only after 
2030 handicaps all policy efforts in this field, and sends a message that the priorities of China 
remain industrialization first, emissions abatement second. While China’s participation in the 
Paris Climate Agreement is vital to the success of that international legislation, and China’s 
engagement with the international community remains a critical piece of the international 
effort to fight climate change, China cannot rely on its emissions market alone – at least in 
its current configuration – to achieve its already-modest goals for emissions reduction. 
Further undermining this struggle is China’s insistence on a casually negligent approach to 
international development, which prioritizes cheap energy production in the developing 
world and Beijing’s geopolitical ambitions over the health of the world’s atmosphere. 
Finally, committing only to reductions in emissions intensity, rather than emissions reduction 
(even with the modest 2030 goal) demonstrates a distinct lack of concern about the billions 
of tons of emissions that China produces as the single largest emitter of greenhouse gases in 
human history. It simply is not possible to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement without 
a significant shift in policy from China. 
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